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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
OHIO'S NEW ONE-CAUSE-OF-ACTION RULE
FOR NEGLIGENT ACTS
Rush v. Maple Heights, 167 Ohio St. 221,147 N.E.2d 599 (1958)
Plaintiff recovered a judgment in the Municipal Court of Cleveland
in the amount of one hundred dollars for property damages to her
motorcycle caused by the negligence of the defendant in failing to keep
a portion of one of its streets in good repair. The plaintiff then com-
menced a second action against the same defendant in common pleas
court for personal injuries arising out of the same incident. The jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $12,000 and a
judgment was rendered in her favor for the full amount. On appeal
the Ohio Supreme Court reversed 6-1, holding only one cause of action
arises from a single tort of negligence even if this wrongful act resulted
in both damage to property and injury to the person.' In reversing
the lower court, the Supreme Court directly overruled paragraph four
of the syllabus of Vasu v. Kohlers,2 a unanimous decision rendered by
the court in 1945.
When a wrongful or negligent act causes both property damages
and injuries to a person the question arises as to whether there are two
causes of action or only one, and the authorities are in conflict. The rule
followed in the majority of states3 is that only one cause of action
1167 Ohio St. 221, 147 N.E. 2d 599 (1958).
2 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E. 2d 707 (1945). See Note, 24 CHI-K NT. L. REv.
183 (1946).
3 Birmingham Southern Ry. v. Lintner, 141 Ala. 420, 38 So. 363 (1904);
Jenkins v. Skelton, 21 Ariz. 663, 192 Pac. 249 (1920); Gregory v. Schnurstein,
212 Ga. 497, 93 S.E.2d 680 (1956); Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Endsley, 167
Ga. 439, 145 S.E. 851 (1928); Fiscus v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 153
Kan. 493, 112 P.2d 83 (1941); Cassidy v. Berkovitz, 169 Ky. 785, 185 S.W. 129
(1916) ; Pillsburg v. Kesslen Shoe Co., 136 Me. 235, 7 A.2d 898 (1939) ; Doran
v. Cohen, 147 Mass. 342, 17 N.E. 647 (1888); Dearden v. Hey, 304 Mass. 659,
24 N.E.2d 644, 127 A.L.R. 1077 (1939); Tuttle v. Everhot Heater Co., 264
Mich. 60, 249 N.W. 467 (1933); King v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry.,
80 Minn. 83, 82 N.W. 1113 (1900); Kimball v. Louisville & Nashville Rd. Co.,
94 Miss. 396, 48 So. 230 (1909); Chamberlain v. Mo-Ark Coach Lines, Inc.,
354 Mo. 461, 189 S.W.2d 538, 161 A.L.R. 204 (1945); Underwood v. Dooley,
191 N.C. 100, 147 S.E. 686, 64 A.L.R. 656 (1929); Anderson v. Jacobson, 42
N.D. 87, 172 N.W. 64 (1919) ; Fields v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 273
Pa. 282, 117 At. 59 (1922); Farmer's Ins. Exchange v. Arlt, 61 N.W.2d 429
(N.D. 1953); Holcombe v. Garland & Denwiddie, Inc., 162 S.C. 379, 160 S.E.
881 (1931); Mobile and Ohio Rd. Co. v. Matthews, 115 Tenn. 172, 91 S.W. 194
(1906) ; Smith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 279 Pac. 893 (1929) ; Moultroup v. Gorham,
113 Vt. 317, 34 A.2d 96 (1943); Sprague v. Adams, 139 Wash. 510, 247 Pac. 960,
47 A.L.R. 529 (1926); Larzo v. Swift & Co., 129 W. Va. 436, 40 S.E.2d 811
(1946).
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accrues, and hence, since a cause of action may not be split,' recovery
of a judgment for either item of damage may be pleaded as a bar
to a second cause of action for recovery upon the other item of damage.
5
These courts 'base their decisions upon the principle that a cause of
action is derived from the negligent act which produced the effect,
rather than from the number of rights invaded, relegating the invasion
of rights to merely items of damage. This rule is based on a policy of
simplicity and expediency,6 rather than upon any legalistic definition of
a "cause of action."
The "two-causes-of-action" rule, (which was the old Ohio rule
under Vasu v. Kohlers7) is still the law in a minority of states, Under this
rule a cause of action is derived from the invasion of each legal right.
Therefore, when a wrongful act results in the invasion of both property
rights and personal rights of a party, two causes of action accrue, and
judgment on one cannot be asserted as a bar to any subsequent action
upon the other.9
In adopting the majority rule, the court in the principal case cited
a quotation from Mobile and Ohio Rd. Co. v. Matthews, e as adequately
expressing the legal reasoning for its decision. That case held:
This (one-cause-of-action rule) is necessary to prevent multi-
plicity of suits, -burdensome expense, and delays to plaintiff,
and vexatious litigation against the defendants.
4 Judgment on the merits for the plaintiff or the defendant in a suit for.one
of several items of damage arising out of only one cause of action, extinguishes
the entire cause of action and thus precludes a second suit for any of the other
items of damage. This is sometimes expressed as splitting a cause of action.
Vasu v. Kohlers, supra note 2; Cincinnati v. Emerson, 57 Ohio St. 132, 48 N.E.
667 (1897); Cockley v. Brucker, 54 Ohio St. 214, 44 N.E. 590 (1896); CLARK,
CODE PLEADING §73 (2d ed. 1947).
5 For a more thorough discussion of this conflict among the various juris-
dictions see 1 AM. JUR., Actions §114 (1936).
6King v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., supra note 3, a leading
case on the one-cause-of-action rule, held that "the views we have adopted seem
to us more in harmony with the tendency towards simplicity and directness in
the determination of controversial rights."
7 Supra note 2.
8 Boyd v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 218 Fed. 653 (1914) ; Schermerhorn
v. Los Angeles Pacific Ry., 18 Cal. App. 454, 123 Pac. 351 (1912); Clancy
v. McBride, 338 Ill. 35, 169 N.E. 729 (1924); Ochs v. Public Service Ry.,
81 N.J. 661, 80 Ad. 495 (1911); Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Pacing Co., 170
N.Y. 40, 62 N.E. 772 (1902); Watson v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 8 Tex. Cir. App.
144, 27 S.W. 924- (1894); Carter v. Hinkle, 189 Va. 1, 52 S.E.2d 135 (1949).
9 Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co., supra note 8, held that "if, while
injury to the horse and vehicle of a person give rise to but a. single cause of
action, injury to the vehicle and its owner gives rise to two causes of action,
it must be because there is an essential difference between an injury to the person
and an injury to the property that makes it impracticable or at least very
inconvenient in the administration of justice to blend the two."
10 Supra note 3.
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As a consequence of the decision in the principal case it becomes
apparent that where there is no subrogation involved a plaintiff must
now ask for compensation for both property damage and personal injury
in the same action or be subject to merger or bar.1 ' But the effect of
this new ruling on subrogated or assigned claims still remains unans-
wered. To exemplify this problem let us assume that A takes out a
"$50 Deductible Collision Policy" with the B Insurance Company. Under
the terms of the policy the company agrees to pay A the full amount
of property damages he may sustain on his motor vehicle less $50,
provided A assigns or subrogates any claims which A may have for
damage done to his motor vehicle. Now suppose that A and X are
involved in an accident in which A suffers $500 damage to his automobile
and also extensive personal injuries. Under the terms of his policy B
Company pays A $450 in return for which A subrogates to the B
Company his claim against X for property damages."2 If the B Company
then files an action against X to recover the money it had advanced to
A and judgment was rendered on the merits, would this judgment
constitute a bar to a future suit by A for recovery on his personal
injury claim?
Under the minority approach the above illustration presents no
problem because the insured has only assigned one of his two causes of
action to the insurer. Under the majority approach, however, the insured
has only one cause of action, and an assignment of part of that cause
of action and a subsequent suit thereon by the assignee could be said
to amount to a splitting of a cause of action, and consequently a bar
to any subsequent suit by the insured. Most one-cause-of-action jurisdic-
tions have recognized an exception to the one-cause-of-action approach
when a subrogation claim is involved,' 3 treating these particular cases
in the same manner in which they would be treated under the minority,
or two-cause-of-action rule. Those jurisdictions within the majority
bloc refusing to recognize this exception require the insured and the
11 When judgment for the plaintiff is had on one item of damage of a
cause of action, the whole cause of action is said to merge in the judgment
and any subsequent suit must be brought on the judgment and not on the original
cause of action. When a judgment is rendered on the merits in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiff cannot thereafter maintain an action on the original
cause. The judgment is said to act as a bar to any subsequent action. See
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§48, 49 (1942).
12 Despite the fact that the insurer gave $450 to A, he is still assigned the
whole claim. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. McNeil, 103 Ohio App. 279, 143 N.E.2d
727 (1926). Then, if the company recovers $500 from X, it will give A back
the $50 he had to expend under the policy.
1 3 Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Moore, 304 Ky. 456, 201 S.W.2d 7 (1947);
Underwriters at Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Vicksburg Traction Co., 106 Miss. 244, 63
So. 455 (1913); General Exchange Ins. Corp. v. Young, 357 Mo. 1099, 212 S.W.
2d 396 (1948); Underwood v. Dooley, supra note 3; Farmer's Ins. Exchange
v. Arlt, supra note 3.
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insurer to join as party plaintiffs in a single action in order to preserve
their respective rights against the defendant.14
The court in the principal case, discussing the subrogation problem
in dictum, recognized and approved the exception to the one-cause-of-
action rule where subrogation claims are involved. 5 It should also be
noted that paragraph six of the syllabus of the Vasu case (a paragraph
which was not overruled by the principal case) states that where a
subrogation claim is involved an insurance company may bring a separate
action for indemnification."6 The facts involved in the Vasu case were
identical to those in the hypothetical question raised above. It is reason-
able to infer that the court in the instant case, in failing to overrule
any of the other syllabi in the Vasa: case, is approving the disposition
between the parties effected by the Vasu decision disagreeing only with
the reasoning which led to that disposition. Although it seems likely
that the court will adopt the subrogation exception when the proper
issues are brought before it, until the question is definitely settled a
danger exists that an action -by an insurance company on a subrogated
property damage claim might bar any subsequent suit by the insured
for personal injuries arising out of the same accident.
Even if the court does recognize the exception to the one-cause-of-
action rule where a subrogation claim is involved there is still a possibility
under Revised Code section 2307.20"7 that a defendant can force the
insured to join as a party in any suit brought by the insurer for indemni-
fication. In the Ohio case of Philadelphia National Insurance v. Scovan-
ner,18 the court held that the defendant could join the insured as a
necessary party under the joinder statute, in an action -between the
defendant and the insurer, on the basis that under a "$ 5 0 Deductible
Policy" the insured would recover-that portion of the loss he had stood
under the insurance contract in the event that the insurer won the case.
Under a similar interpretation of Revised Code section 2307.20 a person
who had collected under a deductible policy (and most collision policies
are of this deductible nature) could, in the event that his insurance
company filed suit before he did, be forced to join in that suit as a party
34 Glove & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, 167 Tenn. 83, 34 S.W.2d
1059 (1931) ; Moultroup v. Gorham, supra note 3; Sprague v. Adams, supra note 3.
1 5 Rush v. Maple Heights, supra note 1, at 233; 147 N.E.2d at 606.
1 Paragraph 6 of the syllabus in Vasu v. Kohlers, supra note 2, holds
that "where an injury to person and to property though a single wrongful act
causes a prior contract of indemnity and subrogation as to the injury to the
property, to come into operation for the benefit of the person injured, the indem-
nitor may prosecute a separate action against the party causing such injury for
reimbursement of the indemnity monies paid under such contract."
17 The statute states that "parties -who are united in interest must be joined
as plaintiffs or defendants."
1886 Ohio App. 435, 92 N.E.2d 832 (1949); See also Duncan v. Willis,
51 Ohio St. 433, 38 N.E. 13 (1894) ; Verdier v. Marshalville Equity Co., 70 Ohio
App. 434, 46 N.E.2d 636 (1940).
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with the insurance company. If the insured was made a party to such
a suit the issue of negligence would be res judicata in any future action
with the defendant, the issue having already been decided in the prior
case in which they were both parties. 9 Another important question is,
could there in fact 'be another suit? That is, could the insured in an
effort to escape the prejudices arising from being joined with an insurance
company refrain from trying his personal injury claim in the property
damage suit, or would his failure to plead all the elements of damage
result in a splitting of his cause of action and thus bar any future suit
he may attempt to bring? This question has not yet presented itself
in any majority jurisdiction.
A possible answer to the above question might be found in the
decision of a Kentucky court, wherein the exception to the one-cause-
of-action rule operating under a statute similar to Revised Code section
2307.2020 was held to prohibit an insured, who had already recovered
a judgment for personal injuries in a separate action against the de-
fendant, from being joined in the insurer's suit against the defendant,
because such insured could not have instigated the action.2" It seems
clear that the Kentucky court views the exception as creating not two
distinct causes of action, but rather one cause of action in the insured
and one in the insurer, and that each must present his full claim in the
first suit in which he is a party. Assuming the Ohio Supreme Court is
as anxious in the future as it has been in the past to put an end to "vexa-
tious litigation," it seems logical to conclude that they would require the
joined insured to present his full claim at his first opportunity.
It may be possible to avoid the problem of joinder in the subrogated
property damage claim if the insured in the subrogation agreement waives
all contractual rights he may have had under the insurance contract to
any portion of the judgment recovered by the insurance company against
the defendant. In such case it would seem that there would be no basis
for joinder of the insured under Revised Code section 2307.20.
Another question is presented by the actual disposition in the prin-
cipal case. The instant court admitted that although the rule in the
Vasu case had been distinguished in one case,22 and explained in another,23
it had remained unchanged until the overruling.24 The two-cause-of-
action rule embedded in the Vasu case had become a well known technical
rule of pleading, and one which had been relied upon by the practicing
bar for some time. The plaintiff in the principal case had no way of
knowing that in choosing to bring separate aLtione ghe would lose her
19Mansker v. Dealers Transport Co., 160 Ohio St. 255, 116 N.E.2d 3
(1953). See Note, 15 OHIO ST. L.J. 382 (1954).2 0 Ky. RULES CIV. PROc., §19.01 (1953).
21Traveler's Indemnity Co. v. Moore, supra note 13.
22 Markota v. East Ohio Gas Co., 154 Ohio St. 546, 97 N.E.2d 13 (1951)
23 Mansker v. Dealers Transport Co., supra note 19.
24 Rush v. Maple Heights, supra note 1, at 229, 147 N.E.2d at 602.
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right to recover for personal injuries. The plaintiff had relied upon the
decision in the Vasu case, and this reliance was certainfy reasonable. In
view of this reliance, the effect of the retroactive overruling in the
principal case seems harsh. If the court in the principal case was so
determined to abrogate the two-cause-of-action rule, it should have pro-
vided for the overruling to act prospectively only,2 5 rather than subject
the plaintiff in an ex post facto manner to the newly adopted rule.
Whether or not one agrees with the method or the reasoning of the
court in the principal case, the fact remains that this case is now the rule
in Ohio. The court, by overruling the Vasu case and adopting the ma-
jority view that a single tort gives rise to only one cause of action in the
injured party regardless of the number of rights invaded, forces the
practitioner to reevaluate his position in any future litigation involving
both property damage and personal injuries.
Alan E. Berman
25 "A majority, probably, of the state courts accept the traditional assump-
tion of the common law that the business of a court is to determine just grounds
of decision in the case before it and, by the same token, that any ground of
decision of which the court approves ought to be applied in the case before it.
In the last half-century, however, a contrary practice of engaging, on occasion,
in what is called prospective overruling has made great headway, and assumed
substantial importance." HART & SACKS, BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 660-61 (tentative ed. 1957). In Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Bryant, 296 Ky. 815, 177 S.W.2d 588 (1943), the court overruled a previous
decision "provided however, this opinion is not to be given retroactive effect so
as to affect appellee's policy and other contracts made and entered into subsequent
to the effective date of the opinion in the O'Brien case."
The constitutionality of prospective overruling was upheld in Great Northern
Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
[Vol. 19
